Most studies of electoral behaviour in New Zealand do not pay much attention to the religious-secular cleavage. While a few studies noted a religious-secular cleavage prior to the adoption of proportional representation, most have assumed that such a divide since 1996 has been confined to the margins of electoral politics, with religious voters supporting smaller third parties over National. This article re-evaluates this conclusion using data from the New Zealand Election Study since 1990. The analyses show that, rather than supporting small third parties more clearly representing issues of concern to them, religious voters have voted largely for National in most elections as part of a religious-secular cleavage between National
As identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their magisterial study of party system development, one major social cleavage that divides the electorates of several countries is the cleavage between religious and secular. Although other cleavages have declined in significance over the last several decades since the publication of their seminal study (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992) , the divide between religious and secular remains significant in many countries despite considerable secularisation (Elff 2007; Minkenberg 2010) . Though rarely emphasised relative to the impact of other social cleavages, some previous research from prior to the adoption of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) found evidence of a religious-secular cleavage in New Zealand between the more religiously inclined National Party and the more secular Labour Party (Levine and Robinson 1976; Bean 1988 Bean , 1992 Minkenberg 2010) .
Since the adoption of MMP, however, the consensus view is that religious differences are largely irrelevant for electoral politics, affecting only support for third parties on the margins of New Zealand politics (Boston 1994, 74; Barker and McLeay 2000, 145-147) .
Because third parties explicitly representing the social conservatism of religious voters compete with National for religious voters' support (while religious-secular issues have not been the primary foci of the two largest parties), and because MMP provides more incentives for religious voters to support third parties than was the case under first-past-the-post, religious voters may have shifted their support to third parties representing socially conservative issues explicitly. As a result, the religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour in elections seen in earlier elections is argued to have disappeared in elections held under MMP.
In contrast to previous research, I argue that the religious-secular cleavage remains an independent cleavage in New Zealand electoral politics that divides National and Labour voters. Moreover, I argue that this is due to the fact that the bulk of religious voters' support in most elections has gone to National. While many religious voters tried supporting socially conservative third parties immediately after MMP was adopted, they reverted to supporting National because these third parties failed to deliver many seats and offered even less influence over policy than is offered when supporting National. This reversion back to National has occurred because National remains the most likely right-of-centre party to form a government (more so today than between 1993 and 2002).
In the next section, I review the existing evidence-both the literature suggesting a religious-secular cleavage exists and the literature suggesting it does not-in greater detail.
Following that, I conduct two sets of analyses. The first examines the impact of religioussecular differences on voting behaviour between National and Labour in recent elections; the second examines the degree to which religious voters' support has gone to National (as it did in the past) relative to third-party alternatives. A final section concludes with a discussion regarding the need to revisit the importance of the religious-secular cleavage in New Zealand politics.
Theoretical Background
When discussing the social bases of electoral politics in New Zealand, previous research identifies several relevant social cleavages.
i The most obvious are class issues, which have constituted the main division between Labour and National since the 1930s (Alford 1963; Robinson 1967; Bean 1988) . A second is an ethnic cleavage whereby Māori and Pacific Islander voters overwhelmingly support Labour whilst National draw largely from voters of European descent (Aimer and Vowles 2004; Iusitini and Crothers 2013) . In addition to these cleavages, other research finds evidence of an urban-rural cleavage (Honey and Barnett 1990) , a gender gap (Coffé 2013) , and differences in voting behaviour among religious denominations.
ii One cleavage that has received relatively little attention is the religious-secular cleavage.
iii Those few studies examining this religious-secular cleavage find that religious voters favour National-due to the social conservatism of religious voters relative to secular voters iv -whilst secular voters prefer Labour (Levine and Robinson 1976, 317-319; Bean 1988; Minkenberg 2010) . Though these findings have received only scant attention, in part due to the greater strength of other cleavage-based explanations, these previous studies suggest that a religious-secular cleavage in voting behaviour was present throughout much of the twentieth century.
However, the fact that most studies examining the religious-secular cleavage are confined to the period prior to the adoption of MMP leaves open the question whether a religious-secular cleavage persists into the present day. Since the adoption of MMP, most studies examining New Zealand party politics have either declared religious issues to be of minor consequence for electoral politics (at least for party choice between National and Labour) (Vowles 1998a, 66-67; Barker and McLeay 2000, 145-147) or ignored religioussecular issues altogether (Boston 1994, 74; Fairburn and Haslett 2005, 530) . Further evidence that the religious-secular cleavage has been marginalised is the fact that the main parties say very little about issues dealing with religious-secular themes: one is hard-pressed, for instance, to find issues pertaining in a meaningful way to religion in the major parties' recent manifestos.
The reason many believe the religious-secular cleavage, to the extent that it divided National and Labour voters in the past, has disappeared is because MMP provides incentives for the two largest parties not to represent religious/secular issues. Because National and
Labour are rooted primarily in class and ethnic cleavages, these parties have an incentive to avoid issues of morality, which may divide the parties internally and in turn distract from the parties' primary agendas-as has been the case with parties in other Westminster systems (Smith and Tatalovich 2003) . Moreover, because MMP produces seat shares that are more proportional to parties' vote shares, third parties representing specific issues that the two largest parties do not fully address are more likely to attract enough support to win representation than they would under the first-past-the-post system. Given this, one might expect that any religious-secular cleavage observed between National and Labour prior to the adoption of MMP would have evaporated, as these two parties concentrate on issues related to their ethnic and class-based differences and leave religious-secular issues to be represented by third parties. The early success of the Christian Coalition shortly after the adoption of MMP suggests as much. As a result, previous research argues that a religious-secular
cleavage-if such a divide exists-remains confined to the fringes of politics, failing to impact support for the two main parties.
Despite these arguments, there are reasons to believe that a religious-secular cleavage persists. Were the base of religious voters to decline in size, this would suggest that the impact of religious voters on support for National has declined, as variation in the impact of social cleavages on party support depends in part on the size of groups (Lachat 2007; Best 2011) . While there certainly has been considerable secularisation of society over the past several decades (Hoverd 2008; Vaccarino, Kavan, and Gendall 2011) , religion has not gone away and there is still a fairly steady base of religious voters. Among those who remain religiously committed, issues of traditional morality may still matter at the ballot box. If anything, the fact that societal development and the secularisation of society lead to more socially conservative religious voters suggests religious voters today will be even more likely to support right-leaning parties than in the past (Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013) .
The persistence of religious voters as a small, but non-trivial constituency can be seen in Figure 1 , which displays the proportion of voters in each election attending religious services at least once per month between 1990 and 2014 using data from the New Zealand
Election Studies. Figure 1 shows that the proportion of voters attending religious services at least once a month in 2014 was roughly similar to that proportion observed in 1990: despite societal secularisation, roughly 20 percent of the voting population remains religiously observant. Thus, the pool of religious voters who could potentially support National remains nearly as deep as was the case in elections prior to the adoption of MMP. As a result, if the religious-secular cleavage has disappeared, this was not due to a lack of religious voters.
On a more fundamental level, one would expect the religious-secular cleavage to persist because issues of concern to religious voters continue to divide society in New Zealand, and thus should continue to play at least some independent role in electoral politics.
While they rarely feature prominently in political campaigns, important social issues like abortion, same-sex civil unions/marriage, LGBTQ rights, divorce, prostitution, and euthanasia (to name a few) have emerged as major political issues since the adoption of The lack of long-term viability for these socially conservative parties is predicted by previous research suggesting that religious groups constituting less than a majority will seek to preserve resources and enhance their political power by working with large parties that have the best chance of implementing policy instead of third parties catering to particular groups of religious voters. v Because religious voters constitute a small share of the electorate, third parties appealing exclusively to socially conservative religious voters have virtually no chance of attracting enough votes to put such parties in contention to form the government.
Given the effects of other social cleavages like class, ethnicity, and urban-rural residence noted above that likely undermine the cohesiveness of religious voters as a voting bloc, the exclusive appeals of these socially conservative parties even make it difficult for such parties to win enough votes to cross the five percent threshold to win parliamentary representation.
Without representation, these parties cannot deliver on the policies their supporters demand.
With these limitations in mind, and because National remain the only right-of-centre party that could plausibly form a government, many socially conservative religious voters may have come to view that they are better served by supporting National and pressuring their MPs to support their issue concerns than they are when supporting socially conservative third parties. While these religious voters might not have perceived a benefit to supporting National when the party had no chance of forming the government-as was the case in the 1990s and early 2000s-they may be more likely to vote for National now that the party stands a good chance of leading the government and given that the socially conservative third parties they have supported in the past have failed to elect many seats. By supporting National over third-party alternatives, socially conservative religious voters can put pressure on National MPs to represent their positions on votes dealing with issues of morality. Even if this tactic is not always successful (e.g. marriage rights were extended to same-sex couples under a National government), socially conservative religious voters are at least able to lobby a larger number of potentially sympathetic MPs when they support National; such lobbying was not possible when they supported third parties without parliamentary representation. In sum, there is reason to believe that the religious-secular cleavage seen in elections prior to the adoption of MMP (Levine and Robinson 1976; Bean 1988 Bean , 317-319, 1992 Minkenberg 2010 ) has persisted in recent elections. Despite the use of MMP and the presence of parties adopting socially conservative positions, socially conservative religious voters have incentives to support National over socially conservative third partiesparticularly when National is in contention to form the government. The remainder of this article examines whether the evidence bears out these claims.
Research Design
To determine whether a religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour exists in the contemporary party system-and if so, how durable this cleavage is-I examine data from the New Zealand Election Surveys (NZES) between 1990 and 2014. These dates cover the entire period under MMP. This allows me to examine voting behaviour before and after the adoption of MMP in order to determine whether the incentives for greater party system fragmentation under MMP have resulted in a weakening of any religious-secular cleavage, or whether a religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour remains salient despite MMP.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I examine voting behaviour using a dependent variable that is coded one for National and zero for Labour. Because the discussion above suggests religious-secular differences divide voters primarily along National-Labour lines, I initially focus primarily on voting for these two parties. These To measure religious-secular differences, I divide respondents according to respondents' frequency of attendance at religious services-which is one of the standard measures used in previous research (Elff 2007; Minkenberg 2010) . I code respondents attending religious services once a month or more as one and those attending less frequently as zero. viii I use this coding scheme rather than the entire range of the scale due to differences in measurement between the 1990 and 1993 NZES and subsequent NZES surveys: whereas the 1990 and 1993 NZES uses five categories (once a week, two-three times per month, several times per year, less than several times per year, and never), subsequent NZES waves included a sixth category for those attending once per month. ix That being said, using the full range of the scale produces results that are substantively equivalent to those presented here.
In order to reduce the possibility that any relationship between attendance and vote choice is due to the impact of other social group-based effects that overlap with religioussecular differences, I include several variables to control for the major alternative hypotheses.
In addition to religious service attendance, I include a dummy variable ('Traditional') measuring voters belonging to religious denominations that have traditionally supported National (Anglicans, Presbyterians, Catholics, and Methodists) (See, e.g., Vowles 1998a, 66-67) . Because the effect of attendance may be redundant among voters belonging to these religious groups (i.e. religious voters belonging to each of the four denominations was already likely to vote for National irrespective of their religious commitment), I include a variable measuring the interaction between this variable and attendance. To rule out the possibility that what appears to be a religious-secular cleavage may turn out to be spurious once accounting for the differences between voters belonging to ethnic minority groups and voters of European descent, I include a dummy variable in which voters of European descent are coded zero, and respondents of all other ethnicities are coded one.
To rule out the impact of the class cleavage/socioeconomic differences, which are generally believed to be the most important social group forces structuring political choices in New Zealand, I include dummy variables measuring households with union members and respondents holding university degrees, as well as a variable measuring household income.
In 1990, the income variable ranges from zero to six (low to high income); in 1993 and 1996, this variable ranges from zero to eight; and from 1999 to 2011, this variable ranges from zero to seven. Due to the high numbers of non-responses, I use mean substitution for missing values. Additionally, I include dummy variables for respondents residing in rural areas (to control for the urban-rural divide), a dummy variable for female respondents to control for a possible gender gap, and respondents' ages at the time of election. In order to facilitate comparisons between the effect of attendance and the effects of each other variable, I
standardise income and age by subtracting the mean from each variable and dividing each by twice the standard deviation; previous research shows this allows for comparisons between scale and dummy variables (Gelman 2008 ).
The Religious-Secular Cleavage Between National and Labour
Parameter estimates from each regression model estimating the impact of attendance on National/Labour voting behaviour appear in Table 1 The results show that the differences between religious and secular voters in most instances remain significant after controlling for alternative explanations. Those belonging to the four denominations that have traditionally supported National are significantly more likely to vote for National (while the effect of attendance among these voters is tempered by their denominational background, as implied by the negative coefficient for the interaction).
The results also suggest that voters of non-European descent are significantly less likely to vote National than voters of European descent. Although the coefficients for the attendance variable suggest the effects of the religious-secular cleavage in most elections are not as strong as the effects of other variables like income or union membership, the results suggest the impact of attendance is also independent of the effects of the other major cleavages.
To visualise the impact of the religious-secular cleavage on voting behaviour, Figure   2 presents the predicted probabilities of voting for National among frequently and infrequently-attending voters. I generate these probabilities assuming voters do not belong to 
Religious Voters and Support for Third-Party Alternatives
To evaluate whether the religious-secular cleavage remains concentrated primarily on National and Labour or whether religious voters have switched to third parties more explicitly representing issues of concern to socially conservative religious voters, I reestimated each model in Table 1 by replacing the binary vote choice measure with a categorical measure including all parties in each election whose support could reliably be estimated using multinomial logistic regression. For ease of interpretation, I omit parameter estimates and instead present the predicted probabilities of voting for each party among voters frequently attending religious services (holding all other variables at their median values) in Table 2 . To help the reader evaluate the argument that the degree to which religious voters support National over third-party alternatives depends in part on National's chances of forming a government, I present National's vote share in each election at the top of Table 2 . While National's vote share is a problematic ex ante measure, it is a good proxy for the likelihood that National will form the government: because pre-election polls have predicted National's final vote shares quite well (See, e.g., Roberts 1991, 1994; DigiPoll 2014) , xi National's vote shares reflect the fact that voters could anticipate whether National was a viable contender for government and adjust their behaviour accordingly.
The predicted probabilities in Table 2 side with Labour, these religious voters also desert National for third parties more explicitly representing issues of concern to socially conservative religious voters. This includes the Christian Coalition in 1996 (where the predicted probability of support among voters frequently attending religious services is 52 percent), Christian Heritage (with a predicted probability of 19 percent), and United Future (where the predicted probability is 43 percent).
Even though National receives a plurality of the support of religious voters of European descent, the struggles faced by National could even be seen in 1993, when many religious voters deserted the party for the Alliance (which attracted many protest votes, but also several religious Māori voters attracted by the party's focus on Māori rights) and New Zealand First (which has taken many socially conservative positions over the years).
As argued above, this variation in the degree to which religious voters side with National over third-party alternatives can be explained in reference to the electoral viability of third parties and National's chances of forming government. It was when National was National instead of these third parties. As a result, the predicted probabilities in Table 2 show that a plurality or majority of high-frequency attenders supported National between 2005 and 2014.
Thus, despite the use of MMP, National continues to receive the bulk of the votes of religious voters of European descent in most elections despite the presence of socially conservative third parties. Because socially conservative third parties have proved to be structurally limited in the degree to which they can attract voters and win seats, the results presented above suggest that many religious voters will continue to concentrate their support on National over socially conservative third parties as long as National remains a viable contender to form governments. This, in turn, reinforces the conclusion reached above that a religious-secular cleavage focused to a large extent on the divide between National and Labour remains under MMP.
Conclusion
This paper has re-evaluated the presence and impact of the religious-secular cleavage on voting behaviour in elections to Parliament in New Zealand. While a few studies conducted prior to the adoption of MMP found evidence of a religious-secular cleavage in New Zealand (Levine and Robinson 1976; Bean 1988 Bean , 317-319, 1992 Minkenberg 2010) , those studies conducted since the adoption of MMP have argued that religious issues and the small group of religious voters concerned with these issues have been relegated to the margins of third-party politics since the adoption of MMP. This is because (1) issues of concern to religious voters rarely feature in discussions among the largest parties, (2) the largest parties usually avoid responsibility for these issues whenever they do arise by deciding these issues as conscience votes, and (3) MMP provides incentives for issues of concern to many religious voters to be represented by third parties focused more explicitly on these issues (whilst MMP provides incentives for religious voters to support these parties).
In contrast to previous research, this paper argued that a religious-secular cleavage has resurfaced in recent elections. The analysis performed here reached two conclusions. First, the analysis showed that a religious-secular cleavage has been observable in most elections.
Second, the analysis also showed that this cleavage remains focused to a considerable extent Entries are the predicted probabilities of voting for each party among voters attending religious services at least once per month who do not belong to one of the four denominations that traditionally have supported National (all other variables held to their median values). * indicates that the predicted probability of voting for National is significantly greater than the percentage voting for Labour at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests). '-' indicates that the party contested the election but was too small to include in the analysis. Note: the solid black line is the predicted probability of voting for National among voters frequently attending religious services (and who do not belong to one of the four 'traditional' religions), while the solid grey line is the predicted probability of voting for National among voters infrequently/never attending religious services (dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals), using the results from Table 1 and holding all other variables at their median values. i While some definitions of 'cleavage' require political parties representing social group interests more explicitly than is the case with National/Labour regarding religious/secular issues-see Bartolini and Mair (1990) -this paper builds on previous research concerned more with the behaviour of religious groups and their voters for the appearance of religious cleavages (see Raymond 2016) . ii While some research finds evidence of a cleavage between Protestants and Catholics-see, e.g., Medeiros and Noël (2013) -other research suggests that Catholics tend to side with Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists in supporting National over Labour-see, e.g., Vowles and Aimer (1993, 33-34) ; Vowles (1998a, 66-67) . iii This is not to ignore those studies that have mentioned the religious-secular cleavage: Nagel (1994; Vowles (1998a); Miller (2005, 52-63) . iv The social conservatism of religious voters can be seen when looking at attitudes towards homosexuality. Using the item 'Homosexual relationships are always wrong' from the New Zealand Election Studies shows that only about 20 percent of frequently attending voters in 1993 had a liberal attitude towards homosexuality (defined as those disagreeing with this statement), compared with ~40 percent among never/infrequent attenders; while the share of liberal responses increased among never/infrequent attenders in 2008 to ~60 percent, fewer than 30 percent of frequently attending voters held liberal attitudes. v On these points, see Raymond (2016, 367-369) . vi Although National may not represent socially conservative religious voters' issue positions as clearly as many of the third parties seeking their votes, some previous research-Jansen, de Graaf, and Need (2012)-showing that religious voters' support for socially conservative parties in the Netherlands was not dampened by moderated party positions suggests religious voters may not be put off by National's less-committed stances. vii The results replacing the party vote-based measure with the electorate vote-based measure provide even clearer evidence of a religious-secular cleavage than the results presented here. The fact the electorate votebased measure produces clearer evidence of a religious-secular cleavage suggests religious voters put even more pressure on their MPs than the National Party as a whole. viii Respondents were asked the following question: 'Apart from weddings, funerals, and baptisms, about how often if at all do you attend religious services these days?'. ix Results using the full scale to measure frequency of attendance rather than the dummy variable used here produce results that are substantively equivalent to those presented here.
x Non-attending voters may have supported National in such large numbers due to Prime Minister Key's positions regarding same-sex marriage. Following the adoption of same-sex marriage, which Key and several other National MPs supported, it is possible that the probabilities of voting for National do not differ by frequency of attendance because National now appeals to both religious and secular voters. It remains to be seen whether National will be maintain this coalition in future elections or whether secular voters will leave National and turn to other, more secular parties. xi While the polls in 2005 showed a tight race between National and Labour, they still predicted National's outcome correctly (e.g., "National cuts Labour's lead" 2005). xii The difference in the ratio of National:Labour probabilities between the results in Table 2 from 1999 and those seen in Figure 2 is due to the difference between the two measures of the dependent variable: the impact of attendance on the probability of voting for National is stronger when examining the binary measure than when other parties like Christian Heritage are included. xiii See the discussion in note vii.
